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NOTE

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2531st MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 3 May 1984, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2531)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

The meeting was called to order at 11.35 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of May, I should like to pay tribute on behalf of the Council to Vladimir A. Kravets, representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of April. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Mr. Kravets for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Antigua and Barbuda, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of those countries to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece), and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Jacobs (Antigua and Barbuda) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to remind members that in the course of consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Rauf Denktaş in his personal capacity, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Denktaş, in accordance with rule 39. At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Denktaş to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Council is meeting today in response to the request contained in the letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council [*S/16514*].

5. Members of the Council have before them document S/16519, which is the report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution 544 (1983).

6. The Council will now hear a statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou. I request the Chief of Protocol to escort the President into the Council chamber and to the place reserved for Cyprus at the Council table.

7. It is my honour and pleasure on behalf the Security Council to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus, and to invite him to address the Council.

8. President KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): First of all, Mr. President, I thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to address the Council today. I also thank you and the members of the Council for meeting to discuss once again the situation in Cyprus.

9. The Council has been seized of the Cyprus problem for the last 20 years. I am sure that many members recollect the various deliberations in the Council and

the repeated warnings we have made to the international community with regard to the real threat to the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus —to its very survival as an independent country.

10. I will not go into many details regarding the past. It might be useful, however, to quote from two documents alone. The first document is a letter addressed to the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, by the then President of the United States, President Johnson, 20 years ago, on 5 June 1964. President Johnson stated:

> "It is my expression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey"—at that time there were the repeated threats of intervention—"is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960.[1] I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island."

The intention of Turkey at that time, even before then, was more than obvious, more than clear.

11. Now I am going to quote from another document, which showed the complete connivance between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which is the same as the leadership today. It is a United Nations document, a report submitted by the then Secretary-General 19 years ago, in June 1965—well before 1974, before the invasion and the occupation. The late U Thant stated:

> "The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together. . . . Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed"—this is 1965—"to physical and geographic separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots." [*see S/6426, para. 106.*]

12. There are many documents from which I could quote, but I do not think it is necessary. If necessary, of course, in the course of the debate my delegation can provide many other documents, with similar evidence.

13. I submit that despite the fact that there may have been in the past some doubts regarding the real intentions of Turkey, by now there should be no doubts at all. The doubts of the past, I submit, were unfounded; yet today no doubt can be justified. Actually, now is the moment of truth for all of us—for us who are quite aware and conscious of our historic responsibility towards our country and its very survival. But with all due respect I submit this for the Security Council as well.

14. What has happened throughout these 20 years? Negotiation, mediation, compromise after compromise —no result. I am not talking, as I said before, in detail, but look at the 10 years before 1974. They were quite the same and they resulted, in July and August 1974 and since then, after the invasion, in 37 per cent of the territory of Cyprus being under the occupation of Turkish troops. The Prime Minister at the time of the invasion, the socialist Mr. Ecevit, said that he was invading Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee for the purpose of restoring constitutional order which had been undermined by the *coup* that had taken place.

15. Well, it took Turkey 10 years to restore constitutional order. But in fact, that was not the purpose. It was never the purpose. I do not think the invasion would have taken place if it were not the plan of Turkey to impose partition. I do not think that any of these things that have happened—before and since 1974 and up to this moment—would have taken place unless the plan was to impose partition. What was the reason for trying to change the demographic character of the occupied area by uprooting almost 200,000 people from their homes and installing settlers from Turkey in their place? What was the purpose? Was it to restore constitutional order? Or was the purpose to set up separate institutions in the occupied area and introduce various other measures clearly aimed—as we repeatedly warned the Security Council, the General Assembly and the international community as a whole—at implementing a plan which had already existed for a long time? So to take the attitude that we can still have doubts today about the plans and intentions of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots is, I submit, quite unjustifiable.

16. Why are we here today? After 15 November 1983, the date of the so-called unilateral declaration of independence—that secessionist act which was condemned by the international community as a whole—we were promised that some effort would be made to reverse this train of events, that the international community would take steps to stop this catastrophe for Cyprus and reverse what had happened at the expense of the territorial integrity and the very existence of a small Member of the United Nations.

17. What was the outcome? The Secretary-General made a proposal to the Turkish side to freeze that process, despite the fact that the resolution of the Security Council called for reversal. The Secretary-General asked the Turkish side for a freeze, and their answer, apart from documents—let us not be overly concerned with documents today—to the Secretary-General, to us, to the Security Council, to the international community, was: "We do not care what you say. We will exchange ambassadors." Indeed, they have exchanged ambassadors and in the most ceremonial way dismissed whatever the Security Council said and whatever the Security Council stands for. Any lack of action on the part of the Security Council from now on, or anything which may again be regarded as tolerance will not make the situation any better: it will make it much worse.

18. On this occasion the warning is slightly different from that of previous occasions. The warning here is that we as Cypriots and as members of the Government of Cyprus—and I as President of the Republic of Cyprus fully aware of my responsibility—see coming the end of Cyprus as an independent State unless the Security Council acts quickly and effectively.

19. If this situation is allowed to continue, the very *raison d'être* of the United Nations will not only be undermined but will ultimately be destroyed. We have come here because we need the Council's assistance. If we maintain the attitude that still prevails in the world today, so many years after the Second World War and despite the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on Human Rights, resolutions of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and so many other declarations, I am afraid that solutions will be imposed by force and not arrived at through common sense, logic and principle.

20. I admit that we are weak, that we cannot fight—at least not without assistance—to restore our rights. On the other hand, we long for a peaceful solution; we do not want further violence and fighting. Why are we weak? Because we are militarily weak. But are we to be punished for that and to disappear as an independent country? What will be the future of many other countries in the world if the Council supports efforts to dispose of Cyprus? What will happen then?

21. Naturally, the international community and the United Nations through its organs have repeatedly called for negotiations—originally for mediation, later on for negotiations; since 1975 for intercommunal talks; then for the good offices of the Secretary-General, and so on. What has been the result? What has happened?

22. In 1975—after the invasion and the occupation—being weak in every respect, we would have been entitled to take the line of refusing to negotiate unless and until the occupation troops had been withdrawn. The international community agreed that the occupation troops must be withdrawn but declared that in the meantime we should try to negotiate. We did just that—on and off for 10 long years. While we were negotiating—through intercommunal talks, good offices and other initiatives– the other side, pretending that they were interested in such initiatives, proceeded with the implementation of their plan.

23. As the Council knows, in addition to the good will we showed throughout those 10 years, we accepted positions that had been unthinkable in the past. In the course of this process, we repeatedly advanced proposals concerning an overall solution to the Cyprus problem. We arrived at two high-level agreements within Cyprus, the purpose of which, by the way, was, *inter alia*, to exclude secession and division. We accepted federation as a solution to the internal structure of the Cyprus problem, something which, because of the realities in Cyprus and because of the size of Cyprus, had been unthinkable in the past and excluded by all British constitutional experts during the colonial period. What else can we do?

24. Recently, even after the so-called unilateral declaration of independence, I made another proposal for an overall solution to the Cyprus problem embodying a completely new framework, which I submitted to the Secretary-General [*S/16549, annex*]. I did not do it for propaganda purposes; that is why I did not make it public, as others might have done—although I do not think there is now any reason not to make it public. I say this not because I entertain any hopes in that connection—and I shall come to this, together with other statements we have made in the past—but so that the international community may see to what extent we have gone in our sincere desire to ensure a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. I shall request our delegation to ask the Secretary-General to distribute that proposal to the members of the Council and of the United Nations.

25. We are convinced that the good will we have shown and all the concessions we have made—compromise after compromise—given the lack of effective action on the part of the international community, have not done any good; they have done much harm. They have strengthened the intransigence of the other side, which has found negotiations, intercommunal talks, good offices and initiatives very convenient. "Let us get engaged in these things but, at the same time, pursue our plan." That is what the other side has been doing; it has been pursuing its plan.

26. Of course, I realize that it is normal practice in bodies like the Security Council, from time to time, to hear counsel and advice to be calm and moderate. But I am afraid that Cyprus could be finished and would still be asked to be calm and moderate. There is no longer any room for that.

27. The signs are quite clear. The Security Council in its resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983 called upon the Turkish side to reverse their 15 November declaration. Did they do so? They announced the holding of a referendum in August for the purpose of approving a new constitution for the so-called separate independent entity, the occupied part of Cyprus; they decided to hold elections in November to elect the new president and organs of the so-called independent Cyprus. On the eve of the visit of the Secretary-General's representative to Cyprus to assess what was happening with regard to his efforts, Ankara and the illegal régime in the occupied part of Cyprus proceeded to a formal exchange of ambassadors. What else does the Council need by way of a message from these people? Is there anything else to be added? They made it clear to us a long time ago, and I am sure that by now they have made it clear to everyone.

28. They have now started talking again about high-level meetings, about talks and initiatives. What do

they want to achieve? Obviously, they want some kind of machinery which would mean recognition of some sort. And then they would perhaps want other kinds of initiatives to pursue the same plan: "Let us keep the international community asleep, pretend we are interested in this and the other, but pursue our plan."

29. The Cyprus problem is not an East-West dispute. Quite frankly and realistically, I feel that in that sense it is not a complicated issue; it is something on which the international community agrees.

30. The problem is whether this agreement by the international community can be implemented; for what will happen to Cyprus if it is not implemented, and what will happen to other countries that might find themselves in similar circumstances sometime in the future?

31. Not only are they trying to ridicule the Security Council—I am sorry to say this, but the Council really is being ridiculed, having taken a decision in November providing for a course of action, when they do exactly the opposite. They presume that they can dictate their terms not only to us but to the entire international community.

32. I am going to convey to the Council another message they are sending to us and to the Council. I am going to quote a spokesman of the so-called Government in the occupied area; I am sure that members will get the message. He said, "We will make the Greek Cypriots"—meaning the Cyprus Government—"pay for appealing to the Security Council." We are not even allowed to appeal to the Council any more. Do you realize what point we have come to? This meeting of the Security Council is in no sense a formality; it is of a decisive, determining character. The spokesman went on to say that "The cost of their action"—our action is to come to the Council, here, today—"will be the opening of a part of Varosha to the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots within a short time"—in other words, to colonize another occupied part. By the way, they have in mind not only Turkish Cypriots; they already have quite a few thousand from Turkey over there.

33. This spokesman of the so-called independent Turkish Cypriot State goes on: "Each time that the Greek Cypriots"—meaning the Government of Cyprus—"have appealed to the United Nations Security Council or the General Assembly they have paid a price for it. Here is the declaration of our republic; here is our flag;"—they have made a flag—"here is the declaration of the dates for the presidential and parliamentary elections; and here is the latest move to open Varosha to the Turks."

34. In all humility I ask, are we entitled to come to the Council and appeal to it? It seems that we should be afraid to do so, that we are not entitled to do so. There may be many other violations of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations of which the Security Council and the General Assembly have been and still are seized, but I believe—and I stand to be corrected; I may be wrong; I am not absolutely certain—that this is the first time that a Government has been threatened with retaliation if it comes to express its views to the Security Council. That is the stage we have reached.

35. There is a question about who is more to blame: Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot leaders. I do not think there is any difference. I believe, in fact, that the answer is Turkey, because the actions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership have all along been in conformity with the policy of Turkey. Let us also be practical: none of this would ever have happened without the occupation of 37 per cent of the territory of Cyprus by Turkish troops. That is the reality, and if we are going to find a way out of this situation the reality must be seen, and the action that should be taken must be taken in the light of that reality.

36. The Council may ask us again to be calm and moderate—to do what? It may ask the Secretary-General to continue with his good offices. It is obvious from the Secretary-General's remarks in his report of 1 May [*S/16519*] that when, in diplomatic language, he cites the need to "revitalize" those good offices and calls for "political support" he means, in my view, much more than that; he means action by the Security Council.

37. But, once again speaking frankly and thinking aloud, I ask: in the present circumstances, what would anyone expect the Secretary-General to do? Should he make other proposals less acceptable to us, other proposals that would be contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations? That would be unfair to him.

38. Therefore, we have nothing against the good offices of the Secretary-General, but if there is going to be any result, we must bear in mind that simply saying "good offices of the Secretary-General" really contributes to the plan of the other side to try again to use those good offices—as indeed they have done with all other procedures—as a means to pursue their plans while pretending to co-operate. There is no room any more for any repetition of these developments.

39. We want a peaceful evolution. But how can one hope that there will be a reasonable arrangement which would ensure, on a lasting basis, peace and security in Cyprus and in the area in general unless the Turkish side—that is to say, Turkey primarily, and, of course, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots—is made to accept in practice the revocation of what they have done, to abandon the plan for partition? Let us face the truth; let us face the reality: if there is no abandonment of the partitionist plan there can be no peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. It is as simple as that, and I am sure that members realize it. What do some people expect us to do? Just to slide along with events and allow the situation to continue until partition is final and, perhaps, until other measures are taken, until everything is irreversible? For our part, we shall do whatever we can not to make it irreversible, but

I submit that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to see to it that its own resolutions are implemented.

40. Mr. President, as I said before in the course of the debate, our delegation will be at your disposal to provide whatever other views are necessary, both in terms of further evidence regarding the expansionist and partitionist plans of Turkey, and in terms of other matters pertaining to the Cyprus problem, especially as it stands today.

41. But again, with all due respect, I should like to put before you this question: is there any doubt in the minds of anyone as to the real intentions of Turkey? If there is doubt, let us continue with the debate and establish whether doubt is justified or not. We are ready to do that for as many days as are necessary, for as many weeks as are necessary, because, as I said before, it is not out of formality that we are here today. The second very pertinent question which arises is, will the Security Council allow, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of its own resolutions, the gradual disappearance of Cyprus as an independent country? These are the issues before the Security Council.

42. It is not a question of details. We are not disagreeing with the other side on certain minor constitutional problems. We do not have any dispute with regard to secondary matters. It must be understood that we are working at cross purposes: we are working for the unity of the country in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations, and they are working for the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus, with partition perhaps as a first step. It is not a question of disagreeing here and there; it is not a question of lack of modalities or of lack of procedures or of any differences of opinion on matters which are not so essential or basic to the survival of a country.

43. It has been 10 years since the invasion. I remember 1977, when the then President of the United States sent a special emissary to Cyprus to meet the late President, Archbishop Makarios, in an effort to persuade him to make far-reaching proposals regarding biregional federation—which in fact he did. The understanding was that there would be a positive response from the other side. Nothing of the sort happened.

44. Let us go back a little further. Let us go back years, to the time of the mediation by the United Nations, to Mr. Galo Plaza and his proposals, before the invasion 10 years ago. Again, those proposals were rejected by the Turkish side, not because they were unreasonable, but because they did not serve the purpose of partition, of Turkish expansion. Since then, how many efforts have been made either through United Nations bodies or through the Secretariat, and with what result? There has been no positive result whatsoever. It is not that there is no way of communicating. It is not that I refuse to meet with Mr. Denktaş—I do refuse, after what he has done, and I will not meet with him unless he reverses what he has done. The least we, for our part, can do is show some political resistance to this attempt to destroy Cyprus in broad daylight and before the eyes of the international community. But there is still nothing difficult about communicating. That is not our problem. Our problem is, what do we do in order to stop this trend of events and to reverse what has happened if we are really and sincerely interested in ensuring the independence, unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus?

45. I do not want to take up more of the Council's time. I would simply like to conclude by once again drawing to the attention of all the Council members the real—the very real—danger to Cyprus and to its very existence. If you now allow the impression to be given that the Security Council will continue to be tolerant, that it will just adopt a resolution and then wait and see, nothing positive will happen and we shall, at the same time, have additional negative developments. It may even be that we may reach a time when it may be too late for the Security Council to act. And if it is too late, then for us, of course, Cyprus will be lost. But the Council will, through its condoning, its tolerance, its lack of action, become—whether we like it or not, and we do not like it—an accomplice to what has been happening at the expense of Cyprus.

46. It was not my intention to use harsh language, but, instead of reading from notes, I wanted to tell you exactly how I feel, how I see the situation. I appeal to you, Mr. President, and to members of the Council urgently to put an end to the situation. Through concerted and other action the Security Council must do whatever it can. I repeat once again: this is not a problem of East-West relations. For the Council, for the United Nations, it is a simple issue of freedom and peace, of justice, of the principles of the Charter. For the Council it is a matter of its own resolutions, the implementation of which is the only way to ensure a process towards a peaceful evolution that would, in turn, ensure the independence, unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, its non-alignment and its continuation as a Member of the United Nations.

47. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is Mr. Rauf Denktaş, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in his individual capacity in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

48. Mr. DENKTAŞ: Mr. President, members of the Security Council, I thank you all for giving me the opportunity to put forward the views of my people. I must also thank Mr. Kyprianou for having convened this meeting, because it appears that this is the only way for my people to have its voice heard and to have its case put. It seems that every time the Turkish people of Cyprus breathes as a political body, every time they act as a political body—for no people can live in a vacuum,

and we have to act as a political body—the Security Council will be convened and we shall face the General Assembly.

49. It is my privilege to appear before the Council. I feel it my duty to restate facts which I am sure the Council knows. It is a good thing to remind Mr. Kyprianou of them also. He purposely suffers from amnesia, because his mind does not go back beyond 1974.

50. The Cyprus problem did not start in 1974. The sovereignty, the independence, the territorial integrity of Cyprus were attacked by the Greek Cypriot leadership, who had formed secret armies and had well planned the attack in advance, in order to destroy the bi-national character of the State, with a view to annexing the island to Greece. Greece was fully behind this conspiracy and helped the Greek Cypriots to do what international agreements told us not to do —namely, to destroy the bi-communal partnership of the State and to make it a Greek State. So, if I take some time in looking at the facts, I ask that I be received with patience.

51. When Mr. Kyprianou pleads for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, he is seeking from the Council a mandate to continue what they tried to do between 1963 and 1974—namely, to end the bi-national character of the State. That is the mandate he is seeking.

52. We have done nothing against the territorial integrity of Cyprus. It was my people that was attacked in 1963 and that was forced to live in little enclaves, defending itself against the illegal administrator, called Archbishop Makarios, while Mr. Kyprianou here, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was dismissing one by one Turkish Cypriot representatives who had to be at foreign embassies and was Hellenising, as he said, the administration of Cyprus. That is what he now wants to consolidate; that is what they have tried to consolidate for years; and that is why the struggle has continued.

53. Amnesia will not save Mr. Kyprianou from the sting of conscience, because I am sure this Organization will not wish to be misinformed and will not be satisfied with half the news, half the facts, but will want to know all the facts before condemning the Turkish people of Cyprus to servitude under the Greek Cypriots.

54. We have established the independent Republic of Cyprus as equals with the Greek Cypriots. The sovereignty of Cyprus was given to the two peoples of Cyprus to cherish and respect, but in the course of my appeal to the Council I shall prove that at the time they put their signatures to the agreements they had already decided to use them to destroy it and to further the struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece. We are guilty because we defended ourselves. Had we not defended ourselves, had we submitted to the rule of Archbishop Makarios after he destroyed the bi-communality of the country, of the State, of its Government, Cyprus would now be part of Greece. To them it is liberty, freedom; to us it is colonization. That is where we clashed. That is where the clash is.

55. Mr. Kyprianou demands from the Council the right for the Greek Cypriot majority to be able to decide the destiny of Cyprus. He has no such right under the international treaties, which they have flouted without fear for years, trusting that misinforming the world assembly would lead them to final victory. He now sheds crocodile tears, because he sees that merely misleading the world assembly takes people nowhere. He has suggested that we are flouting the Security Council. We are too small a people to do that. What we are defying is the attempt by one section of a bi-national country to deceive the world assembly, to deceive this body, by falsehoods.

56. I am a lawyer by profession. It is my duty, when any court of law is misled into giving a wrong judgement, to appeal and to seek justice for my client. In this political forum there is no right of appeal, except the decision, the courage to continue to struggle for freedom and to tell the people all the time that the struggle is to cherish the Charter of the United Nations and not to become colonized by Greeks in Cyprus, until this is understood and decisions are changed.

57. We are accused of dividing Cyprus because we did not allow Greek Cypriots, with 20,000 troops from Greece, to occupy Cyprus and to annex it to Greece. We are accused of partitionist tendencies because there came a moment in our history, in our struggle, when we saw that resisting the union of Cyprus with Greece was costing the lives of our people. So we said, "Since two peoples live in Cyprus, let us divide it. Since you want to be united with Greece, let Greece take you to its bosom, but do not take us with you." That is how partition arose. There was no deliberate partitionist policy. Partition was our defence, our only reasonable civilized alternative to *enosis*.

58. I have asked the Greek Cypriots to confirm in words and deeds that *enosis*, union with Greece, is not in their plans. What have they done? I will tell the Council in a moment.

59. Instead we are told by the Prime Minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, immediately after his accession to power in October 1981, that the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper, which forms the basis of our negotiations for a bi-zonal federal republic, is an imperialist plan, and he urges the Greek Cypriot side to reject it. Then, in February 1982, he comes to Cyprus and he gives a speech in which he says, "This is part of the national territory of Greece", and he vouches that he will help the Greek Cypriots get rid of the Turks in Cyprus. On 28 October 1983, Mr. Papandreou again refers to Cyprus as part of the national territory of Greece.

60. In 1964, the elder Papandreou, his father, was hand in hand with Archbishop Makarios in attacking the international agreements that had created the binational Republic of Cyprus, a *sui generis* State, a partnership which could continue only as long as the agreement which created it was honoured. But Greek Cypriots destroyed it. We defended our rights, and in November 1964, while Turkish blood was flowing in Cyprus and the union of Cyprus with Greece was the aim of all, Andreas Papandreou said, "The union of Cyprus with Greece will be the union of two Greeces." So we were living in Greece and we did not know it. Cyprus was Greek; Cyprus was Greece. It was our fault, it was our sin, that we did not accept that Cyprus was Greek. We do not accept it now. We shall never accept it. That explains the crocodile tears. "There are two Greeces. Now we shall make them into one." That is why the Cyprus problem has not been settled: because we did not allow Cyprus to become part of Greece. On 4 March 1982 *The Cyprus Weekly*, a Greek Cypriot newspaper, criticizes Papandreou for having said this.

61. During his recent visit to Cyprus, the Prime Minister of Greece rekindled the dormant Greek Cypriot wish for *enosis*, union with Greece. This is what we are facing. We were pushed into declaring our statehood in order to prove to Mr. Papandreou and to Mr. Kyprianou that in Cyprus there exists a Turkish people that will never allow Cyprus to be the second Greece in the Mediterranean, that will never allow Cyprus to be united with Greece and that has entrenched itself within its 1960 status and rights in order to help re-establish a bi-zonal federal republic.

62. We move from father to son. On 27 October 1964, in a speech given at the University of Salonika, Mr. Papandreou says, "All Greek Cypriots are for *enosis*. Cyprus must become the springboard for the dreams of Alexander the Great in the Orient." We have prevented this. We are guilty. We shall never be forgiven. And the Council is asked in the name of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus—by those who have tried to destroy that sovereignty and territorial integrity—to punish us, to condemn us and to make us the servants of Mr. Kyprianou. That is what is being asked of the Council, and I am sure it will not accept it.

63. Quotations are plentiful, and we shall come to them one by one.

64. When did the Government of Cyprus break down? I shall quote from the Secretary-General's report of December 1964:

> "One basic set of obstacles stands in the way of the solution of such problems: the claim by the Government"—the Greek Cypriot administration—"on the one side, that Turkish Cypriots should submit to its authority and to the law; the position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other side, that, pending a final settlement or a return to the Constitution, the authority of the present Administration ought not to be recognized by members of its community." [*See S/6102, para. 175.*]

The writ of Makarios ceased to be a legal, judicial writ as soon as the bi-communality of the country was destroyed in December 1963.

65. I have watched Mr. Kyprianou very carefully. He has done his best to dramatize the situation, and he has told the Council that the independent Republic of Cyprus will be destroyed if it does not act and, I suppose, if it does not punish us. I have listened to him carefully in order to discover the grave developments or the threat to peace on which he has based his request for the convening of the Council. I have learned nothing, except that we have made our unilateral declaration of independence, that the Security Council has condemned us and that from that day on we have not reversed our decision.

66. The last time I addressed the Council [*2500th meeting*] I told it that the request that we reverse our position was a request to destroy a living political body. In that body my people has its rights and status, which are underlined by the 1960 treaties, which Greek Cypriot arms tried to destroy and in defence of which we lost 103 villages and 107 mosques and lives in the thousands; in defence of which my community was put to the torch for 11 years—which Mr. Kyprianou forgets because he was busy here, trying to deceive the whole world. He had to shut his eyes to what was happening on the island.

67. So what is the position in Cyprus? We have declared our statehood, and we have said frankly that we have done so in order to put an end to a stalemate that has been continuing for 21 years. For the first time I have heard Mr. Kyprianou complain about that stalemate, a stalemate they have created and will continue to create as long as they are treated as the legitimate Government of Cyprus.

68. All Council members represent Governments here, and I ask them: in whose Government is one fourth of the community put outside the budget, outside the administration, outside the protection of the State, treated as a rebel—not just for a couple of months but for 20 years—with attempts made to take away all its political and constitutional rights? Yet this Council, where the protection of human rights is the utmost concern, where the sanctity of international treaties is very important, is still asked to condone all that was done to us.

69. We are, in line with our rights and our status as co-founder partners of the bi-national State of Cyprus, living in the north as a result of 11 years of untold misery and attack and denial of justice by Greek Cypriots from 1963 to 1974, having been liberated just in time by Turkey, as a guaranteeing Power. We are ready to re-

establish the federal Republic, for which there exists an agreement, a formula and a procedure. We have been inviting the Greek Cypriot side to come to the table and negotiate and to leave these one-sided complaints and resorts to international forums where, in most cases, we are not even heard; but they do not like that table: inter-communal talks can only lead to the re-establishment of a bi-national State. Why should they come to the table when they are treated as being in charge of the whole of Cyprus, its legitimate Government and its only people? Would you come if you were given this advantage, and the other side, which you have been trying to destroy for years, was doing its best to save its rights and no more? What alternative was left to us after being treated the way we were for 20 years by the Greek Cypriot side?

70. So I call upon him to come to the negotiating table in order to establish a bi-national, bi-zonal federal republic, in accordance with my agreement with Archbishop Makarios [*see S/13369, para. 51*] and his endorsement of it in 1979. For doing so, for his coming to the table, I have said that I am not asking him to recognize my State, to recognize me as the President of that State, as I do not recognize him as the President of the whole of Cyprus and as I do not recognize his as the only people in Cyprus.

71. We met Archbishop Makarios as the representatives of two peoples, as the leaders of two peoples. When I shook the hand of Archbishop Makarios on our first meeting, he said, smiling, "Mr. Denktaş, you know that I do not recognize you as the President of the Turkish administration."—it was "administration" then. I replied "Of course, Archbishop, I do know that, and you know that I do not recognize you as the President of Cyprus." The man smiled, said "Yes, I do." We sat down and we started talking. The present Secretary-General was a witness to all these things. Then I met Mr. Kyprianou. When we met I did not meet the President of Cyprus and he did not meet the President of the Turkish Cypriot administration. We met as the two representatives of the two peoples. After the declaration of our statehood, I called for a meeting with him in our capacities as the representatives of the two peoples; I continue to keep the door open and he says he will not meet me until I reverse the decision of my statehood.

72. That decision is not mine. I cannot reverse it. It is a decision of my people, which has suffered for 20 years, lacking liberty and freedom, struggling in order not to lose its identity and status, dying in order to prevent Greek Cypriots from destroying the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, from making it a land attached to Greece. They have declared it; more than 83,000 signatures were there to verify it on the day it was declared.

73. So what is our fault now that we have all of a sudden decided to have a constitution, to put it to a referendum, to have elections? We did not decide this all of a sudden. This was all decided on the day we declared independence, that this was the procedure to be followed. My community is accusing me of delaying the finishing of the constitution, of delaying the referendum and the elections. They say that I am doing this deliberately in order to give the Secretary-General time to intervene and to stop the whole process. I have promised them that is not so. We are moving slowly because we want to test the Greek Cypriot side as to whether they will come to their senses and realize that Cyprus is Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot, whether they will accept the 1977 formula [*see S/12323, para. 5*], whether they will come to the negotiating table. That is why we are moving slowly. But it appears that each time we take the natural step of establishing another missing link of our statehood, we shall be brought here in order to defend ourselves.

74. In Cyprus there is no crisis. In Cyprus there can be no crisis, because the Greek Cypriots live, prospering immensely, in the south. They are deriving all the benefits of their false pretence that they are the Government of Cyprus by getting all the international aid and credit. They are becoming richer and richer. If they have any financial difficulty it is because they are spending more than they should on arms and armaments for a reason that we neither know nor understand, because we do not intend to settle the Cyprus problem by arms. We have no claim and no aim on the south of Cyprus. It is they who claim the right to come and rule us. We have no such claim. In the north, since liberation by Turkey, we have been living in dignity, without fear, in freedom, having established our democratic procedure.

75. We are ruling ourselves, as we have done since December 1963, when we were thrown out of the Government, out of the organs of State. Therefore, when Mr. Kyprianou sheds crocodile tears for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, I have to put on record that morally he is not the President of the whole of Cyprus, because he has not been elected in accordance with the 1960 Constitution. Legally and constitutionally he is not the President of Cyprus because that Constitution is in the dustbin. His is not the Government that that Constitution foresees. That Constitution foresees a Government in the organs of which Turkish Cypriots participate fully. We were thrown out of that bi-national Government on 31 December 1963, and we have not been allowed to go back unless we accept the Constitution as not being there, that the amendments that they thought they should make have been made, and Turkish rights have been abrogated. We have not submitted to this, and therefore Mr. Kyprianou has no right to talk about defiance of the Security Council, defiance of international law or anything of that kind. He is not here with clean hands, and he cannot blame us for defending ourselves, for not submitting to him.

76. The *coup d'état* by Makarios against the bi-national character of the State was not successful be-

cause we did not submit to him, because he never took possession of Cyprus as a whole. That *coup d'état* has been simmering until today, and the same pretense continues.

77. What I regretted most about Mr. Kyprianou's statement was the part where he said that he was not ready to meet me and that he saw no purpose in meeting me. I repeat, the Cyprus problem will be settled by the two peoples. I met the Greek Cypriot leaders only twice in the last 20 years, in the presence of the Secretary-General. On those two occasions we succeeded in coming to a conclusion and in finding a formula for settling the Cyprus problem. I want to meet Mr. Kyprianou again because they have been running away from that formula for the reasons I have explained, and I believe that if we face each, if I can prove to him why we have been pushed into this corner after 20 years and what we expect of Cyprus in the future—if I can convince him—we can come to an agreement. This offer is there, but he says he cannot accept it unless I withdraw the declaration of statehood.

78. Has he stopped any of his activities under the assumed title of Government of Cyprus? He has not. He is all over Europe trying to punish my community, trying to impose an illegal embargo on economic activity, accusing us falsely, the way he has accused us today, of trying to partition the island just because we did not allow him to take it all. We have asked him to stop these activities in order to show some good will to my people. No. He is the Government of Cyprus and he will continue as such until the end.

79. I understand why he is reluctant to meet me. He is reluctant because Mr. Papandreou, the Prime Minister of Greece, has told them and keeps on telling them that intercommunal negotiations will not bring justice to Cyprus. On 24 November 1983 Mr. Papandreou said: "We can hold negotiations only for a unitary Cyprus. For us, neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution." During the last four months Mr. Kyprianou visited Athens 14 times for instructions, the last time with all the party leaders. Had we acted similarly they would have circulated letters saying, "Look at Denktaş, the tool of Ankara". No, we do not do this; they do. But what is the direction they get from Athens? Is it not clear? I repeat the same quotation: "We can hold negotiations only for a unitary Cyprus. For us, neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution." And the Secretary-General is asked to use his good offices within the agreed context, namely for a federal republic, to help the parties, and we are supposed to defy the Secretary-General and place his efforts in difficulty when all that we are doing is trying to be helpful to him and show him that Greek Cypriots are not on that track and that therefore this train will not go to the federal republic station. I repeat: during the last four months, 14 visits for aligning the Cyprus policy—and this is what they call the Hellenic Centre's view—on the talks. Is it we who do not want the Secretary-General, in whom we have the utmost trust? Is it we who create difficulties for him? Or is it the Greek Cypriot side, which never wants intercommunal talks, taking full advantage even of our right to make counter-proposals when something is put before us?

80. I have been talking to the Secretary-General. He had never given me anything on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, because he knows that that is not part of his good offices function. He is not a mediator. He has always said, "May I have your views on it?" I have given my views on it, after consulting with my people. But I must not do so. Why? Because the moment I see the Secretary-General Mr. Kyprianou makes a statement in Cyprus: "This is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If Mr. Denktaş makes counter-offers he has destroyed the initiatives of the Secretary-General." That is what he says, but it does not accord with the facts of life.

81. So why are we here taking up the Council's time? On 18 December 1983 Mr. Kyprianou stated his policy:

> "In order to make the Turkish Cypriots retract their illegal attempts, we are not only going to continue our internationalization of the question, but we are going to increase our attempts. World public opinion has to be convinced that the Cyprus question does not need a theoretical solution to the problem, but a practical, decisive and just solution must be found. That is why we are here. Not because there is a crisis, not because there is a grave situation."

Part of the internationalization programme is being put into effect, and they will come again and again to the United Nations in order to get resolutions which, if implemented, would do to my people what their guns and economic embargoes have failed to do. That is what they want; they will not be satisfied with less.

82. I must thank the Secretary-General for giving full publicity to all my letters in his latest report [*S/16519*]. In them the Council will find comprehensive suggestions and transitional suggestions for the settlement of the problem. This is not disrespect for the office of the Secretary-General or for the Security Council; this is not evidence that we do not want to negotiate. It is clear evidence that we are fully in the negotiating process, that we want the negotiations to continue under the agreed terms and that we are not running away from negotiations.

83. It is therefore my objective to try and be helpful to the Council and to the Secretary-General with regard to his call for the reactivation of the negotiating process. In his report the Secretary-General says:

> "The Security Council entrusted the mission of good offices to the Secretary-General in 1975 and has regularly extended it since then. It is for the Council now to assess the present situation and to decide what action needs to be taken to revitalize the search for a peaceful settlement and to provide it with the necessary political support. I am convinced that this

search is vital to the interests of all the people of Cyprus as well as to the wider peace." [*Ibid., para. 24.*]

84. I have tried to tell the Council why the negotiating process has not been successful. It cannot be successful as long as the Council continues to treat one of the parties to the problem as the legitimate Government of Cyprus when that party lacks all the fundamentals of legitimate government. A government in a bi-national State 100 per cent of whose organs are Greek Cypriot cannot claim to be the legitimate Government of that State, especially when it has put its hands on that State by armed force, in spite of international treaties registered with the United Nations.

85. Hence the Council has a golden opportunity to tell Mr. Kyprianou that he has to see me, that by seeing me he is not going to concede that I am the president of any State, just as I am not going to concede that he is president of the whole of Cyprus, and that it is the wish of the Security Council that such a meeting take place. Dialogue is the only way to peaceful negotiation. Picking up faults here and there and running away from dialogue is an indication that they are satisfied with what they have—and why should they not be satisfied, since they have the title of Cyprus in their pockets unjustly and can deceive the world that Turkey has invaded Cyprus?

86. I shall briefly refer to some of the things he has said. He referred to Galo Plaza, saying that we had refused to accept his report. In fact, Greek Cypriots were the first to reject Galo Plaza's report because he was not giving them *enosis* immediately but was delaying it for some time. We rejected his report because he should not have publicized it; he should have allowed time for the parties to look at it and enter into negotiations. But from the memoirs of the notorious terrorist Grivas we read years later that:

> "In the last days Girgotis has learned that Dimis Dimitriou is a close friend of Galo Plaza. Following this, Dimis Dimitriou was requested to ask Galo Plaza what sort of a secret proposal he would be making for a solution of the Cyprus problem. Dimis Dimitriou had a meeting with Girgotis on 1 October and gave this information: Galo Plaza intends to give a report in line with the solution envisaged by Greece, even if his report is to be thrown into the waste-paper basket. And he is surprised that we"—the Greek Cypriots—"have not implemented a military administration and have not united with Greece in the economic field."

87. This is the mediator of the United Nations, and we are asked to accept any mediation report, no matter what kind of a report it is, even one which assails our liberty and condemns us to servitude. I shall not embarrass the United Nations by reading out further from this report; but I recommend that it be read. Grivas conspires with a friend of Galo Plaza and they send Galo Plaza to Beirut for entertainment to his liking.

88. We respect the Security Council. We have the highest respect for the Secretary-General, and we want his good offices to continue. But please allow us to defend our rights as best we can.

89. Mr. Kyprianou said that we had threatened him with retaliation if he came to the Security Council. I reject what he has read. It may be a commentary by a Greek Cypriot writer on what the spokesman said. I have no recollection of such a statement by the spokesman. Mr. Kyprianou misunderstands what we are trying to tell him when we implore him: Do not take this matter to the Security Council; this is a matter on which we can talk and must talk; that is what the international community wants. He takes this as a threat. We also tell him: you have no legal feet to stand on in that Security Council because one of your feet is missing and that is the Turkish foot. You have to be bi-national in order to be there; there has to be a Turkish Cypriot representative sitting with you so that you can be representing the Government of Cyprus. Where is that representative? They have dismissed all Turkish representatives in the foreign service: in Moscow, in London, in Washington, in New York, in Egypt. They have dismissed them all. When did they do this. Not after Turkey came; not after we declared independence: they did it in 1963 and 1964.

90. His assertion that everything has been planned by Turkey for the partition of the island and that step by step we are going in that direction is a remarkable one. If Turkey has a plan for partitioning the island, then Mr. Papandreou and the Greek Cypriot leadership must be in conspiracy with Turkey, because for the last 20 years they have constantly been giving Turkey and us every opportunity to divide the island, by treating us as non-existent in Cyprus, by trying to destroy us, and by forcing us to put a line between ourselves and their attacking forces. They must be in conspiracy with Turkey to bring about that partition.

91. But that we were not so planning is obvious from the records of the Secretaries-General over the years. In 1963, when they attacked us, all our civil servants were ejected from the services. We tried to have them accepted back. On 10 September 1964, in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated the following:

> "The UNFICYP [United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus] authorities, from the beginning of their mandate in Cyprus, gave serious consideration to this question and on several occasions raised it with the Cyprus Government. All negotiations on the possible re-employment of the Turkish Cypriot civil servants in Nicosia and their financial compensation from January 1964 have so far ended in a deadlock, as the matter is considered by the Government to be highly political and closely linked with the final set-

tlement of the Cyprus question." [*See S/5950, para. 108.*]

92. For 21 years, because there has been no final settlement of the Cyprus question, these people have been out of all the organs of the State, while a 100-percent racist Greek administration has been claiming the right to be the Government of Cyprus. Can we, therefore, accept Mr. Kyprianou's version of events? He accuses us of creating separate institutions in all spheres. We are proud that we did so. When we were thrown out of our own State organs we had to survive and live as civilized people; we had to provide for administration and administrative setups; we therefore looked after ourselves. We have learned very well how to look after ourselves; we now want them to share the experiment with us by establishing a federal republic.

93. He says, "I, as the President of Cyprus, see the end of Cyprus as an independent country". Well, it is because he looks at Cyprus without constitutional authority as its President that he sees this destruction, and because he has amnesia and forgets 1963 to 1974 he does not realize that the death-blow to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus was dealt when they attacked us in 1963 and refused to incorporate us, in spite of repeated reports and repeated endeavours by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. We were not born yesterday, and I am sure that all members know the background of the Cyprus problem.

94. "We are militarily weak," he says. "We cannot fight. We want a peaceful solution. Are we to be punished because we are militarily weak?" This is an accusation against Turkey of invasion. Turkey came to Cyprus and drove back an invasion by Greece and its adherents in Cyprus. That is what Turkey did, nothing more, nothing less. And now, like the criminal who is caught by the police, the criminal is complaining. "But the police were fully armed; they had all their men around us. Is this justice? Is this fair?"

95. We have stopped them from destroying our country, a bi-national State, and we are giving them the chance to re-establish it. And in the presence of the Council he is refusing negotiations, he is refusing a dialogue, and he is asking the Council to punish us for not submitting to violence and to the destruction of international treaties. I hope the Council sees how he is playing his hand.

96. He also stated something which I have to correct. He said, "Recently I made an oral proposal to the Secretary-General; I did not make it public because it was sincere." He said that this would be distributed later by his mission. When that proposal is distributed I shall beg leave to tell the Council why we rejected it. The Secretary-General, at Casablanca, gave me the gist of it. He could not read me the proposals in full. Later, when I met with the Secretary-General again I said to him, "Mr. Secretary-General, I have now discovered the full text of Mr. Kyprianou's letter to you. Why did you not give it to me in full?" His answer was, "I knew that you would reject it totally, and it is not my purpose to give parties what they will reject; I try to find something that they could accept. That is why I did not give it to you."

97. How did the Secretary-General know that I would reject it? Because Mr. Kyprianou's offer, which he says he will provide to the Council, did not fall within our agreed solution or within our agreed procedure. It was an offer by the "legitimate Government of Cyprus" to a "rebellious minority". Mr. Kyprianou has to come down to earth. We are his partners. We are part of Cyprus. We want to live in Cyprus in peace and understanding. We have not been able to do so intermingled, because of their *enosis* theory and their *enosis* policy. We want to live side by side and to be partners in a joint venture in the form of federation.

98. I am very sorry; I see members looking at their watches, but this opportunity is given to us very rarely. I shall try to finish as soon as possible.

99. With regard to the exchange of ambassadors, Mr. Gobbi was shocked because of what I did. We were shocked when we heard that Mr. Gobbi was coming on the day he did. We were both caught by surprise. There was nothing deliberate in it; it was an activity of a body politic in which we delayed what we could not stop, and you cannot fix dates for this kind of ceremony all the way and all the time. It had to be done, and, I repeat, it was not deliberate; it was not a slap in the face to the Secretary-General, as Mr. Kyprianou has suggested.

100. When I had met the Secretary-General earlier —and he will confirm this—and he asked me about this freezing of certain activities, I told him frankly: "Mr. Secretary-General, there are activities which we can delay and which we can stop. There are activities which we cannot stop. I shall try to help you as much as I can. That promise stands. But if you are going to ask us to freeze ourselves, I must say that I have not yet seen any frozen Government, nor any frozen State, except, perhaps, for Alaska. It is impossible. Please ask us reasonable things and we will do them—and the most reasonable thing you can ask us is to sit at the negotiating table and to talk, and talk and talk."

101. How can I give a guarantee to Mr. Kyprianou when I talk to him on the first day and the first month that there will immediately be a solution if we have not yet come to the same point of view that Cyprus is not Greek; that Cyprus shall not be Greek; that there shall be guarantees against union with any other country, in whole or in part, and that the bi-zonal federal system must be the aim of both sides? If we do not agree on this, if he pretends to be the Government of Cyprus and its President, and if he says that he sees Cyprus being destroyed, the Cyprus he sees being destroyed is a Greek Cyprus. That is the Cyprus he sees destroyed. But Cyprus is not Greek; thus Cyprus is not being destroyed.

102. We are trying to establish a partnership. We are ready for one, but at the table, not running around the world spending the little money we can afford in order to defend ourselves against imagined and imaginary accusations. We are as good a Government as his. He is not treated the way we are, and the more glory to him. But please, Mr. Kyprianou, do not destroy us. We have stood our ground and defended ourselves. We do not ask you to reverse your decisions; we ask you to correct them in the light of facts. We ask for your compassion for people who have fought for their liberty for 20 years, for people who have been buried in common graves just because they happened to be Turks; yet they did not submit.

103. Please understand us: we are not trying to destroy anything. We are trying to prevent our destruction as one of the peoples of Cyprus, as one of the co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, and we cannot accept the fact that just because Archbishop Makarious, by force of arms, destroyed the partnership in 1963 we therefore have no right at all to claim justice from you.

104. Mr. Kyprianou lives under the impression that we are for partition. I assure you again that we do not have any such intention or any such plan. I ask him to state again publicly that the decision of the Greek Cypriot House—a decision which is still valid, to the effect that the struggle shall continue until the union of Cyprus with Greece is achieved—has been wiped from the books, that he does not want the union of Cyprus with Greece and that he agrees that the national guarantees against it shall continue. I invite him to do that, and I invite him to the table once again.

105. If I have taken more of your time than I should, I repeat, I rely on your compassion and understanding and on the fact that we are one of the two sides in Cyprus, one that has been silenced for years. I trust that you will therefore forgive my indulgence. I thank you, Mr. President, and all the members of the Council for having allowed me to speak.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

NOTE

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.